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Comment:
Professor Roger C. Cramton
Cornell University Low School
Commenting on Peter 0 . Steiner's

"The Legalization of American
Society: Economic Regulation"
Professor Cramton opened with
praise for Professor Steiner's integration of various theories into a
new and effective statement of those
characteristics endemic to economic
regulation which tend to make its
results suboptimal. While Cramton
saw Steiner's typology of the three
types of regulation as helpful in
focusing attention on the purposes of
regulation, he cautioned that "the
typology should be viewed as involving dominant characteristics or ideal
types rather than a description of
historical purity." The three types of
regulation are often intermixed ,
Cramton reminded his audience, in
the constant historical growth of
regulation .
Cramton followed this cautionary
corrective with a more direct challenge to Steiner's hypotheses about
what causes change in regulation .
Steiner's remarks "underemphasize
the responsiveness of our political
institutions to self-interest , crisis,
and catastrophe," said Cramton, who
proposed to discuss the dynamics of
political change that can disrupt
stable regulatory regimes.
Such regulatory axes are made up
of the "iron triangle " of a special interest , its supporters on a controlling
congressiona l committee, and
bureaucrats who find it in their interest to cooperate with them . One
factor which accounts for the permanence of such regimes is the
invisibility of the advantages they
accord. "The most effective and
durable arrangements of this kind
will probably involve a complicated
mix of benefits and exemptions,
each of which is submerged in the
detail of a larger statutory or
regulatory scheme and almost invisib le to the untutored eye ."
Yet this arrangement is vulnerable
to attacks by the sort of single issue
pressure groups whose eyes are
tutored by crises and who can wield
enormous political power in our
system. These groups tend to arise
a nd coa lesce in response to specific,
notorious catastroph es and disasters
w h ich are perceived as symbolic of a
prob lem that shou ld and can be corrected by government.
Wh ile Cramton thus supported
Steiner's argument that specific

harms have led to much of the demand for protectionist regulation , he
challenged Steiner 's claim that current deregulatory fervor reflects a
change. a new disenchantment with
government and a lack of faith in its
power to correct wrongs . Recalling
that "during the past few years of socalled deregulation in a few areas,
hundreds of new regulatory initiatives were enacted by Congress or
were imposed by agency fiat, "
Cramton argued that sentiment for
deregulation , when crises arise in a
field where regulation is already one
of the features of the landscape, is
little different in underlying
philosophy from pressure for regulation generated by disaster. Both
reflect the conviction that government action should bring about the
solution to a problem .
Government's responsiveness to
the powerful interest groups who are
often motivated by adversity accounts for much regulatory change,
while government's reliance on the
support of powerful industries , combined with "the squid-like absorptive capacity of regulation and its
tendencies toward irreversibility,"
does much to fix regulatory regimes
in place . While Cramton seconded
Steiner 's call for " closer scrutiny of
the costs and benefits of regu la lion ,"
he doubted whether it would be the
likel y outcome of the current outcry
for deregulation .
Finally Cramton argued that the
probable and undesirable alternative to such scrutiny is not the
"g lobal and uninformed deregulation" which Steiner seemed to
fear . Rather , according to Cramton,
we should worry that the growth of
regulation will prove irreversible.
Steiner 's own discussion of the "expansive character of regulation , its
endemic faults, and the one-way
ratchet that the inertia of our institutions provides." can be read as
suggesting that deregulation is only
"a small blip on the upward curve of
regulation ." Cramton saw the current danger to lie in the difficulty of
efficiently and effectively "cutting
back much of the perverse regulation that besets us," rather than in "a
simple-minded preference for unregu lated free markets ." Yet like
Steiner , Cramton concluded with the
wish that deregulation might restore
"a much needed skepticism that examines the costs as well as the
benefits of regu latory programs."
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